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ABSTRACT
 This article proposes a multi-agent simulation model to examine how different operational 
environments and incentive mechanisms affect the collective performance of complex humanitarian 
response systems. Using the UN Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) system as an example, a 
stylized model of one service provider, two member organizations and multiple humanitarian crises 
is developed to illustrate the changing uses of four alternative relief goods sourcing options, namely: 
i) own storage for own items ii) UN storage for own items iii) stock-swaps and iv) white stock 
uses.  Under the plausible assumption that the past success of sourcing options influences member 
organizations’ future resource allocation, the model indicates that the additional buffer stock capacity 
offered by horizontal cooperation induces undesirable system dependency: while it gives member 
organizations more flexibility to meet highly stochastic demands under uncertainty, it also encourages 
them to store less of their own relief goods as a result. This tendency was particularly notable under a 
flexible budgeting regime, highlighting the further need to understand and evaluate the details of the 
decision-making heuristics of individual member organizations. 
Keywords: Horizontal Cooperation, Humanitarian Organization, Agent-Based Modeling
1. Introduction
 Learning and improvement are seen as the key to 
successful humanitarian coordination where ever-changing 
and complex operational environments demand proactive 
strategies for the successful delivery of emergency 
assistance (UN 2013; Christopher and Tatham, 2014). 
Responding to the rising demand for global humanitarian 
assistance observed in recent years, the total official 
humanitarian assistance by bilateral and multi-lateral donors 
has nearly tripled from approximately $6.5 billion in 2001 to 
16.4 billion in 2013 (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2009; 
Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014). As the frequency 
and complexity of natural and man-made disasters have 
risen in recent years (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005), 
increasing efforts have been exerted globally to build more 
effective and efficient coordination mechanisms among 
humanitarian organizations. 
	 Horizontal  cooperat ion among humanitar ian 
organizations is increasingly seen as an efficient and 
effective way to coordinate humanitarian preparedness, 
response, and recovery processes under complex and 
changing environments (Thomas and Kopczak 2005, 
Van Wassenhove 2006, Schulz 2009). Unlike vertical 
cooperation in which organizations at different stages of 
the humanitarian response chain collaborate, horizontal 
cooperation encourages pooling of skills and resources 
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among organizations that are operating at similar levels 
(Schulz and Blecken 2010).  The formation of horizontal 
cooperation mechanisms globally is rapidly changing 
the ways capacity building, warehouse management 
and emergency delivery are carried out collectively by 
humanitarian organizations. 
 One example of horizontal cooperation that has 
grown in recent years is the UN Humanitarian Response 
Depot (UNHRD) established in 2001. As of February 2015, 
the UNHRD has grown to a truly global system of six 
warehouses—strategically located across the globe in Accra 
(Ghana), Brindisi (Italy), Dubai (UAE), Subang (Malaysia), 
Panama City, (Panama) and Las Palmas (Spain) offering 
a range of humanitarian logistics services to 65 member 
organizations (UNHRD, 2015). Member organizations 
adhere to a standard set of operational procedures that 
enables effective pooling of resources and substantial cost 
savings in terms of storage, procurement and transportation. 
For example, it is estimated that transporting relief items via 
air to N’Djamen, Chad cost between 25%-45% less from 
the regional depot in Accra, Ghana than the headquarters 
in Brindisi, Italy. By utilizing such regional hubs with free 
storage, many organizations may reduce their humanitarian 
logistics operation costs (UNHRD 2015). 
 However, the growth of such distributed humanitarian 
logistics internationally has also given rise to new 
challenges. The truly voluntary nature of collaboration 
and membership means that their success is predicated on 
member organizations’ good will and trust in the collective 
management system. The shared logistic arrangement 
globally requires continued willingness of organizations 
to collaborate, while the rapid expansion of operations 
seen in recent years will likely add further complexity in 
coordination. There is also a need to acquire continued 
funding support of donor agencies.  
 As previously identified by Schultz and Blecken 
(2010), horizontal cooperation for humanitarian logistics 
coordination may be hampered by a number of institutional 
and operational factors such as: i) the desire of humanitarian 
organizations to maintain logistics as core competency of the 
organization (therefore, its unwillingness to delegate core 
tasks under collective management); ii) the differences in 
organizational culture and mistrust towards each other and 
collective systems; iii) limited transparency regarding the 
benefits of cooperation and iv) a potential lack of resources 
especially during a period of high demand. It therefore 
remains to be seen how a global coordination mechanism 
founded on the humanitarianism of good will and mutual 
support may thrive in the face of growing demands likely 
to materialize in the age of climate change and ensuing 
regional conflicts (Leiras et al. 2014). 
 Given our need to understand the effectiveness and 
robustness of horizontal cooperation among humanitarian 
organizations under changing environments, this article 
proposes a multi-agent simulation model that examines how 
different operational environments and incentive mechanisms 
affect the collective performance of the complex humanitarian 
response system. In particular, the article uses the UNHRD 
system as an example and proposes a model that simulates 
the emerging system behaviors of individual members 
responding to simultaneously occurring humanitarian crises. 
Prior to model development, a number of semi-structured 
interviews with the UNHRD and its member organizations 
were conducted (see Appendix 1 for a list of interviews) 
to understand the current status of network operations and 
challenges.  These on-the-ground insights provided important 
inputs to the design of the present agent-based simulation 
model. While the development of a full-fledged model is an 
ongoing process, this article describes the main features and 
algorithms of the proposed stylized model and presents the 
results based on an illustrative case application.
 The use of a stylized agent-based model of one 
service provider, two member organizations and multiple 
humanitarian crises illustrates the difficulty in coordinating a 
purely voluntary system of collective inventory management 
under highly uncertain demand. Under the plausible 
assumption that the past success of sourcing options 
influences member organizations’ future resource allocation, 
5-yearsimulation runs found that the additional buffer 
stock capacity offered by horizontal cooperation induces 
undesirable system dependency. This was particularly the 
case under the flexible budget system where additional donor 
funding allows a more flexible use of such buffer stocks. 
 Factors such as whether, and to what extent, budgets 
remain binding in the case of a catastrophic event and 
whether and to what extent each organization uses different 
types of heuristics for pre-positioning decisions (e.g. 
according to past success, cost minimization or mixture of 
both) seem to influence how effective incentive mechanisms 
(such as rising and reducing the prices of buffer stocks) 
affect individual decisions and system performance. 
While the present model adopts a highly simplistic set of 
assumptions, further sophistication of model assumptions 
will certainly improve our understanding of horizontal 
cooperation among humanitarian organizations.  
 The remainder of this article is organized as follows. 
First, Section 2 provides a brief overview of the literature 
regarding humanitarian logistics and demonstrates how this 
article makes a major contribution by applying agent based 
modeling analysis to the field of humanitarian horizontal 
cooperation.  Section 3 presents detailed descriptions of the 
modeling structure and algorithms, describing the individual 
decision rules that collectively make up the complex system 
of humanitarian coordination. This is followed by Section 
4, which executes the proposed multi-agent model using an 
illustrative example. Section 5 draws major insights gained 
and describes the next steps for model development and 
further empirical application. Finally, Section 6 provides the 
conclusion of this article.      
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2. Modeling Humanitarian Logistics Operation
 Quantitative modeling has long served as an important 
analytical tool in commercial supply chain management 
(Tayur et al., 1999; Cachon and Terwiesch, 2012; Christou, 
2011). Modeling approaches such as deterministic and 
stochastic optimization as well as various simulation 
techniques have examined how different decision variables 
such as  the level of inventory, timing of production and 
buyer-supplier relationships affect supply chain performance 
such as the overall cost of operation, customer satisfaction 
and speediness of product delivery (Beamon 1998; Caunhye 
et al., 2012). As opposed to commercial supply chain 
logistics, which has long been assessed quantitatively in 
the field of operations research: quantitative studies on 
humanitarian logistics are relatively new with increasing 
attention placed on topics such as strategic prepositioning of 
relief supply (Balcik and Beamon, 2008; Duran et al., 2011); 
optimal inventory control under uncertainty (Beamon and 
Kotleba, 2006) and the relationship between operation costs 
and fund-raising (Wakolbinger et al., 2011; Toyasaki and 
Wakolbinger, 2014) and others (see for example Caunhye 
et al., 2012; Rafael et al., 2013; Ortuño et al., 2013 Gösling 
and Geldermann, 2014 for recent reviews on this topic). 
 In order to understand the complex interactions that 
underlie the dynamics of global horizontal cooperation 
among humanitarian organizations, analytical tools 
should be sufficiently flexible to examine its multifaceted 
nature. This gives flexible modeling environments such 
as multi-agent modeling a natural advantage over other 
techniques for quantitative analysis, in which collective 
system performance can be modeled and evaluated based 
on individual decisions of software agents.  The utility of 
agent-based modeling has been demonstrated in a number of 
recent studies on commercial logistics (Fu et al., 2000; Jiao 
et al., 2006; Lai and Kao, 2009), while its application to the 
humanitarian logistics domain remains limited even today. 
2.1. Commercial versus Humanitarian Logistics
 The existing literature indicates that humanitarian 
logistics are characteristically different from their 
commercial counterparts (Van Wassenhove 2006; Kovács 
and Spens 2007; Pujawan et al., 2009; Apte, 2010, Gatignon 
et al., 2010). Quantitative analysis of humanitarian 
supply chains therefore requires a sound understanding 
of the differences in operational objectives, management 
approaches and workings of the two supply chain operations. 
Beamon and Balcick (2008) for example summarize three 
major areas of divergence between commercial versus 
humanitarian logistics, namely i) strategic goals ii) demand 
characteristics and iii) customer characteristics. 
 Firstly, Beamon and Balcick (2008) assert that the 
humanitarian supply chain differs fundamentally from its 
commercial counterpart since the former embraces strategic 
goals such as reduction in human causality and suffering 
while the latter operates to maximize share-holder values, 
minimize costs and improve customer satisfaction. The 
difference in strategic objectives is closely linked to the 
contrasting ways in which the two entities raise funds—
while humanitarian organizations remain largely dependent 
on donor funding (Wakolbinger et al., 2011; Toyasaki and 
Wakolbinger, 2014), business logistics must ultimately 
be accountable to the shareholders. These differences 
fundamentally shape the ways in which resources are 
allocated to various strategic, tactical and operational 
objectives thereby ultimately determining the characteristics 
of the two logistics systems. As illustrated in Section 3, 
firstly, the proposed model incorporates a set of operational 
goals that are identified as important by humanitarian 
organizations participating in the UNHRD system by 
literature and interviews such as reduction in lead-time and 
overall logistic costs.  
 Secondly, humanitarian logistics must face demands 
that are highly unpredictable. Natural disasters (and to a 
lesser extent regional conflicts), occur stochastically with 
limited ability for organizations to predict timing, locations, 
magnitudes and types of events (e.g. hazards) in advance. 
The specific relief items required also depend largely on 
the nature of crises and the characteristics of the population 
affected. Such unpredictability of demand contrasts sharply 
with that of the commercial logistics system, which serves 
relatively predictable demands in terms of their locations 
and seasonality. Therefore, the proposed model incorporates 
the stochasticity of crisis situations in terms of timing, 
magnitudes and locations of demand occurrence. 
 Thirdly, humanitarian logistics serves a different 
customer base, where recipients of support have no 
consumer choice. There are neither explicit  price 
mechanisms that can regulate demand and supply nor 
many alternative service providers to choose from. This 
fundamentally departs from the commercial supply chain 
where an individual consumer has the liberty to choose 
from a variety of potential suppliers and exercises an 
option to buy items if the market meets its expectation for 
quality, price and overall service. Governing self-organizing 
humanitarian supply chains therefore requires a unique set 
of principles that is uncommon to the commercially oriented 
logistics systems. Instead of market prices, the concept of 
‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ access to relief items, for example, 
becomes an important topic of humanitarian logistics 
studies.  We build an agent-based model that can explore 
these supply chain governance issues (such as prioritization 
of demand) in this study.  
2.2 Vertical versus Horizontal Cooperation—
      Example of the UNHRD System 
 Commercial and non-profit logistics cooperation 
may be categorized as either being vertical or horizontal 
in nature. Vertical cooperation may be def ined as a 
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form of cooperation whereby there are “different actors 
along the value chain of one industry, such as suppliers, 
manufacturers, distr ibution centers and customers” 
(Schultz and Blecken 2010 p. 638) while that of horizontal 
cooperation may be defined as those “tak[ing] place 
between entities operating at the same level in the market” 
(ibid) such as international relief organizations that share 
similar humanitarian operations. Horizontal cooperation is 
being increasingly adopted in both commercial industries 
such as maritime shipment, commercial aviation and others 
(Cruijssen et al., 2007) and also non-profit operations such 
as fundraising (e.g. the Humanitarian Coalition Canada1), 
procurement (e.g. the Humanitarian Procurement Center 
of ECHO2), and relief inventory management (e.g. the 
UNHRD).
 An example of horizontal cooperation explored in 
this article is the UNHRD established in 2001. Through 
strategic prepositioning of relief items, the UNHRD aims 
to achieve speedy delivery of relief goods globally within 
24/48 hours to emergency locations (Table 1). The scope 
of UNHRD service and membership has been steadily 
growing. In 2013 for example, the UNHRD served a total 
of 32 organizations, arranging 951 shipments (7278 MT 
of goods) to 90 countries with a total value of $49 million. 
The system also facilitated the use of 30 stock swaps 
between partners, or an exchange of 400 MT in relief 
goods (UNHRD 2013). Our interviews indicate that the 
UNHRD system is yet to achieve financial sustainability—
approximately 50% of the total operation costs are covered 
through donor funding, and 25% are recovered from paid 
services. The system currently has a 25% shortfall in 
operational funding.
1  Further information is available at: 
    http://humanitariancoalition.ca/
2  Further information is available at: 
    http://dgecho-partners-helpdesk.eu/actions_
    implementation/procurement_in_humanitarian_aid/hpc
Location Total storage (m2) Dispatched in 2013 Users 
Brindisi, Italy 6,600  (covered) 
3,500 (open) 
130 consignments to 
23 countries with the 
total value of $ 9.5 
million.  
FAO, WHO, WFP, Italian Cooperation and 
International Medical Corps 
Dubai, UAE 21,500(covered) 
5,000 (open) 
715 consignments to 
91 countries with the 
total value of $30 
million. 
Irish Aid, World Vision, CARE, FAO, Catholic 
Relief Services, ECHO, Action Contre La Faim, 
Johanniter, Mercy Corps, UNDP, International 
Rescue Committee, Norwegian Church Aid, Qatar 
Charity, OCHA, JICA, Handicap International, 
Korea International Cooperation Agency, 
ShelterBox, Lutheran World Relief, WHO, Italian 
MOFA, WFP, Islamic Relief Worldwide, Concern 
Worldwide, Solidarites International, UNRWA, 
Save the Children, UNHCR, and ACTED. 
Subang, 
Malaysia 
8,250 (covered) 
1,000 (open) 
40 consignments to 14 
countries with the total 
value of $4.4 million. 
ASEAN/AHA, AustralianAID, Care, Irish Aid, JICA, 
Mercy Corps, Mercy Malaysia, NCA, Swiss Red Cross, 
UNFPA, WFP, WHO and World Vision International. 
Accra, Ghana 3,500 (covered) 
5,000(open) 
47 consignments to 17 
countries with the total 
value $4.6 million. 
UNICEF, Shelter Box, UNFPA, UNHCR, JICA, Irish 
Aid, WHO, ACF, IFRC, Swiss Red Cross, World Vision 
International, WFP, and Global Mercy Mission Project. 
Panama city, 
Panama 
3,605 (covered) 17 consignments to 11 
countries with rhe total 
value of $1 million. 
Accion Contra El Hambre, Agencia Espanola de 
Cooperacion Internacional Para El Desarrollo, Comisión 
Cascos Blancos, Intermon Oxfam, Irish Aid, Korea 
International Cooperation Agency, Mercy Corps, 
Shelterbox, Swiss Red Cross, UNICEF Supply Division, 
UNICEF TACRO, WFP, Panamerican Health 
Organization (PAHO), and World Vision International. 
Las Palmas, 
Spain 
1,700 (covered) 
4,400 (open) 
To be operational in 
2014 
To be operational in 2014 
Source: UNHRD (2015) 
Table 1: UNHRD Global Pre-Positioning Network
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 Confirming an observation in the existing literature, 
our interviews also indicate that a variety of motivations 
encourage or discourage humanitarian organizations to join 
or exit horizontal cooperation (Schulz and Blecken 2010). 
Many organizations interviewed stated that they have 
joined horizontal cooperation to achieve cost reduction 
through free-of-charge storage, consolidated procurement 
and transportation, etc.  Organizations also joined the 
UNHRD to gain additional security and f lexibility in 
operation made possible by an option to exchange relief 
stocks in the case of shor tages. Others have joined 
horizontal cooperation to create a collegial brand image 
and to appeal for further donor support. 
 At the same time, a number of factors may also 
hamper their continued membership. As Schultz and 
Blecken (2010) indicate, when an organization has different 
operational philosophies, or if members feel that benefits 
are allocated unfairly, or the system under-performs when 
demands for goods are high, a member may be less willing 
to continue their collaboration. Our interviews indicate that 
some organizations are concerned with the transparency 
and traceability of stock management and shipment and that 
continued under-performance of the UNHRD (long lead-
time) has already affected their willingness to continue 
using the system. Given the diverse strategic, tactical 
and operational goals of humanitarian organizations, it is 
important to evaluate how horizontal cooperation performs 
under different operational environments and how their 
experience will affect a member’s willingness to continue 
such cooperation. The proposed agent-based model 
evaluates these individual incentives and disincentives for 
horizontal cooperation.
 The form of horizontal inventory management 
adopted by the UNHRD system may be described as a 
‘service provider approach’ in which one organization 
serves as logistics services provider for all members 
(Schultz and Blecken 2010). The World Food Program 
(WFP) acts as a service provider for the UNHRD system 
by offering free-of-charge services such as warehousing, 
stock management, white stocks and transportation of 
member relief items. In addition, other services such as 
procurement insurance and stock disposal may be obtained 
on the basis of full cost recovery plus a management 
recovery fee of 7%. 
 Voluntary coordination is an important aspect of 
the UNHRD arrangement. There are neither explicit top-
down mechanisms by which the WFP influences member 
behaviors nor ways to ensure the optimal performance 
of a system. The ser v ice provider approach thus 
departs significantly from the commercial supply chain 
management in which explicit incentives and penalties are 
used to influence supply chain behaviors (e.g., Cachon and 
Zipkin, 1999, Cachon, 2001, Lee and Whang, 1999, and 
Chen, 2001). The proposed model evaluates the emerging 
behavior of voluntary horizontal cooperation in the absence 
of such central management.  
3. Model Description
3.1. Autonomous Agents and Their Major Roles
 This article proposes a stylized multi-agent model of 
horizontal cooperation based on the core functions of the 
UNHRD system. The model represents horizontal rather 
than vertical cooperation and has member organizations 
cooperate in the same level of operations including 
procurement, warehousing and shipping.   The model is 
written and implemented using the agent-based modeling 
language NetLogo 5.1.0 (Wilensky 1999). 
 The software agents included in the model are: i) a 
humanitarian crisis agent that creates and communicates 
stochast ic demands for rel ief items i i)  a member 
organization agent that responds to stochastic relief 
demands with a specific set of operational goals and 
constraints;  iii) a UNHRD warehouse agent that facilitates 
the use of free storage, stock-swap,  white  stocks and iv) a 
virtual observer agent, which ensures that the same random 
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experiments can be performed for reproducibility (Table 2).
 A member organizat ion may choose f rom the 
following relief good sourcing options:  i) own relief items 
stored at a member’s own storage ii) own relief items 
stored at the UNHRD storage,  iii) relief items swapped 
with other UNHRD members and iv) ‘white-stocks’ 
(unbranded supplier’s stocks stored at the UNHRD system) 
(Fig. 1). The model simulates the occurrence of multiple 
humanitarian crises in which member organizations 
collectively aim to deliver sufficient relief items within 
a specified window of lead-time. Based on the perceived 
success of UNHRD system operation,  budget constraints, 
and forecasted demands, a member organization decides to 
decrease or increase relief items stored at the UNHRD and 
Agents Major roles  
Humanitarian Crisis  
Member Organization  
UNHRD Provides storage capacity and offers additional buffer stocks (known 
as ‘white stocks’) in case member organizations run out of their own 
relief items during the period of extremely high demand.  
Virtual Observer A virtual agent who pre-seeds random values and ensures that same 
stochastic scenarios can be repeated.  
Occurs at random geographic locations and creates stochastic 
demands for relief items. Stores and communicates information such 
as when the original demand occurs, when each relief shipment is 
received, what are the levels of remaining demands and whether  
demands are met within specified lead-time targets.   
Participates in horizontal organization and collectively seeks to fulfill 
stochastic demands created by humanitarian crisis. Stores and 
communicates information such as the level of budget constraints, 
the availability of stocks at each sourcing options, and their 
willingness to swap stocks with other member organizations. Learns 
from system experience and forecasts and make ex-ante sourcing 
decisions based on the past success of each sourcing options. 
Figure 1: Overview of the Proposed Model (Source: authors)
UNHRD
Shipment from own storage
Shipment from own storage
Swap
Shipment from UN storage
Humanitarian 
Crisis
Member Organization 1 Member Organization 2
Free storageFree storage
White stock White Stock
Table 2: Agents and their roles in horizontal cooperation 
Figure 1: Overview of the Proposed Model (Source: authors)
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own facilities. 
3.2. Behavioral Assumptions of Horizontal Cooperation.
  
 Using the agent-based modeling framework, the 
UNHRD operation may be represented as a series of 
information exchanges between software agents. Unlike 
the existing multi-agent based modeling of commercial 
logistics that incorporates explicit bidding processes 
of negotiations, shipment orders in the proposal model 
are handled on a first-come first-served basis.  Member 
organizations handle simultaneously occurring demands 
that are highly unpredictable in location, size and 
magnitude. Figure 2 shows an illustrative sequence 
diagram that shows the message fl ows between autonomous 
agents.3
 Firstly, a humanitarian crisis agent is modeled as an 
autonomous agent, who specifies stochastic demands for 
a relief item with a given probability. It is assumed that a 
crisis agent determines its demand at the beginning of its 
formation and exists in the simulation environment until 
its demand is fully satisfied. In this article, all crises are 
assumed to be rapid-onset events (in which members must 
meet acute demands within their lead-time target). 
3  A sequence diagram is a common way to show objects 
and message exchanges in the software development 
literature. For those readers unfamiliar with the concept 
UN Warehouse Other member 
agent(s)
Crisis 1 Crisis 2
If still 
insufficient, 
make a white 
stock order
White Stock
delivery
If remaining_demand = 0 
complete
Check Demand
Check Demand
At lead-time 
target,
Check Delivery
If remaining_demand > 0 
Demand unmet
At lead-time 
target,
Check Delivery
If own item 
not sufficient, 
make a swap 
order
Swap delivery
If own item 
not sufficient, 
make a swap 
order Swap delivery
Current member
agent
If remaining_demand = 0 
complete
If remaining_demand = 0 
Demand fully met
Figure 2: A sequence diagram illustrating the interactions of agents (Source: authors)
Note: At the beginning of the sequence diagram, the current member agent checks if any demands are created for the crisis 
agent and makes a relief shipment arrangement. In the case that its own stock level is insuffi cient, the current member agent 
sends a message to other member agent(s) requesting the use of stock swap (to be delivered at a later time). If demands 
are still unmet, the current member agent sends a message to the UN warehouse, requesting the use of white stock (to be 
delivered at a later time). At a particular lead-time target, the current member agent sends a message to the crisis agent 
again, and checks if and to what extent demands have been met. These sequences are repeated for each member agent, as 
and when new crisis demands are created. Please note that all member agents jointly aim to fulfi ll humanitarian demands, 
therefore the model does not capture cases of confl ict cooperation.
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of a sequence diagram, see for example (B’Far, 2004).
 Secondly, a member organization agent is modeled as 
an autonomous agent, who interacts with other members 
and the UNHRD warehouse agent to meet the demand 
for a given crisis.  In the base assumption a member 
forecasts relief demands based on the experience of 
past crises events. At the beginning of each time step 
(i.e. a day), a member organization agent communicates 
with crisis agents to determine whether a new demand 
has been generated. When a new demand is detected, 
a member agent evaluates whether its own facility and 
the UNHRD warehouse are closer to the newly created 
crisis location and places an order to ship items from the 
nearest facility. The quantity of demand, destination and 
time of the delivery are then stored as a tuple to signal a 
shipment order.  In such a case, if the available stock level 
is insufficient to meet the demand, a member organization 
solicits stock-swaps and use of white stocks at the UNHRD 
facility.  Appendix 2 provides a pseudo-code developed for 
these operational steps.
3.2.1. Forecasting and ex-ante purchasing decisions of a 
member agent
 In th is styl ized example, each member has a 
unique set of initial variables that characterize its initial 
endowment and operational constraints including:  budget 
constraint, demand target (a percentage of disaster 
demand), lead-time target, and willingness to swap 
stocks. At every replenishment interval (T), a member 
evaluates its experience of the UNHRD system recording 
whether and to what extent relief demands have been met 
during the window of its lead-time target (T*). A member 
organization is assumed to forecast a demand based on a 
weighted average of past demands and deliveries. 
Forecasting decisions are modeled in two parts. First, for 
every monthly replenishment period, daily demand is 
forecasted as a weighted average of past demands.
FTDj,T : A forecasted total demand (FTD) for the next 30 
day period determined at the time of replenishment (T; 
T=30) for member organization (j).
IDj,t,i : An initial demand for humanitarian crisis (i) for 
member organization (j) recorded at time (t).
ωt : a weighting factor
 The weight ing factor ω t  in th is model can be 
interpreted as a member organization having a ‘fading 
memory’ (Norling et al., 2001) of past disaster demands. 
Rather than simply dividing the sum of past demands by 
the number of days, Eq. (1) calculates a weighted average 
whereby recent demands are emphasized over earlier 
demands. 
  
 Secondly, an ex-ante sourcing (i.e. prepositioning) 
decision is also determined based on how well each 
sourcing option performed in the past. Performance is 
measured in terms of the proportion of items delivered 
within a lead-time target (T*) from specific sourcing 
options.
 
 For each of the four options, a ratio of past delivery 
success is calculated at the time of replenishment as 
fol lows. The model again assumes that a member 
organization has a fading memory.
Where 
DSj,k.T: The extent of successful delivery from sourcing 
option (k) at a time of replenishment (T) for member 
organization (j).
DDkit:(T′ < T*) : Demands delivered from source option (k) 
for humanitarian crisis (i) that had delivery time (T’) below 
the target lead-time (T*).
TDit:(T′ < T*) : Total demands delivered from all sources for 
humanitarian crisis (i) that had delivery time (T’) below the 
target lead-time (T*). 
ωt : a weighting factor
 In addition, it is further assumed that a humanitarian 
organization has two modes of budgeting behavior, namely: 
i) budget constrained and ii) budget unconstrained. In 
the budget constrained mode, each member organization 
makes purchase decisions based on its past experience 
as described above, while also considering the level of 
its monthly budget constraint. In the case that a purchase 
decision made based on Eqs. (1) & (3) is above its budget 
constraint, a member agent will adjust its purchasing 
decisions by cancelling the order for the most expensive 
category and searching for the next feasible alternative and 
repeating this algorithm until the budget constraint is met. 
In the case that a purchase decision made based on Eqs. (1) 
& (3) is below its monthly constraint, then the remaining 
portion of the budget is carried over to the following 
month.
 In the budget unconstrained mode, ex-ante decisions 
are made in the same manner as the budget contained 
mode, except that when a catastrophic humanitarian crisis 
overwhelms its capacity, an organization is allowed to 
access swap items and white stocks beyond its original 
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budget constraint. This budgeting mode may be plausible 
when additional donor funding can be expected in the case 
of a catastrophic event, thereby an organization faces non-
binding budgets under high relief demands.
 Also,  the U N HR D warehouse is  modeled as 
an autonomous agent, which interacts with member 
organizations to fulfill relief demands created by crisis 
agents. In the following illustrative case, this article 
assumes that only one central UNHRD warehouse exists 
within the software environment, though this assumption 
can also be relaxed by modifying the inventory scheduling 
system. Finally, there is also a virtual observer agent that 
ensures the reproducibility of stochastic scenarios in the 
proposed model.
4. An Illustrative Example
 To demonstrate the utility of this modeling approach, 
this section implements an illust rat ive case of one 
service provider, two member organizations and multiple 
humanitarian crisis situations. While some variables used 
in this illustrative example are selected based on empirical 
observations (e.g. crises demands for example closely 
resemble empirical demands for relief goods reported in 
news releases from 2006-2014 as retrieved from the JICA 
website (2006-2014)4), most data values are chosen for 
purely an illustrative purpose, and therefore should be 
interpreted as such. Under the assumptions described in 
Table 3, we evaluate how the system behaves under two 
alternative budgeting regimes, namely:  i) flexible budget 
regime (C1) and ii) budget constrained regime (C2).
4  Available in Japanese at: 
    http://www.jica.go.jp/information/jdrt/2014/index.html
Table 3: List of baseline assumptions
Humanitarian Crisis
Demand Stochastic demand with a gamma distribution
(  = 4,  =0.16)
Member Organizations
Member 1 Member 2
Demand targets Attempts to satisfy 20% 
of stochastic demand 
for each disasters
Attempts to satisfy 
80 % of stochastic 
demand for each 
disasters
Target lead-time 5 days 5 days
Initial level of own storage 5 units 50 units
Initial level of own item at UN 
storage
10 units 20 units
Budget constrains $30/month $200/month
Willingness to swap stock 100% of own items 
stored at the UN 
storage
100% of own items 
stored at the UN 
storage
Cost for own storage use $10/unit
Cost of UN storage use $5/unit
Cost of Swap Use $5/unit
Cost of White Stock Use $5/unit
UNHRD Warehouse
White stock availability 1000 units/month
Operation modes
Budgeting behaviors C1: Flexible Budget Regime 
C2: Constrained Budget Regime
Source: authors
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4.1. Flexible budgeting regime 
 Under the f lexible budget regime (termed C1), it 
is assumed that a member organization may request for 
further stock-swaps or white-stocks to meet the high 
demands created by catastrophic humanitarian crises. This 
budget flexibility allows for an individual member to meet 
its demand target even in the case of catastrophic disaster 
events. During the 2-year simulation period, Member 
Organization 1 and Member Organization 2 had 18 and 24 
days respectively in which success rates (as determined by 
the proportion of relief items delivered within a lead-time 
target) dropped below 1. Under this regime, both Member 1 
and Member 2 had the tendency to reduce their own stocks 
stored both at their own facility and the UN facility (Fig. 3 
C1).   The uses of stock-swap were on average 2.2 units for 
Member 1 and 1.9 units for Member 2 (Fig. 4 C1). The uses 
of white stocks were on average 5.5 units for Member 1 and 
17.5 units for Member 2 (Fig. 5 C1). 
 Given there was no tight limitation of white stock 
availability, the system tended toward the uses of white 
stocks when acute spikes were observed. As a result, 
member organizations reduced storing their own items. At 
the UN facility, for example, the level of own items stored 
peaked at 12 units during days 90-120 for Member 1 (Fig. 
3 C1 Member 1 UN storage) and at 35 units during days 
90-120 for Member 2 (Fig. 3 C1 Member 2 UN storage). 
For both members, the level of own items stored never 
recovered to their original levels. This is because 
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Figure 3: Changes in members’ decision to store own items at the UNHRD warehouse
Source: simulation results by the authors
Figure 4: Changes in members’ decision to store own items at own warehouses
Source: simulation results by the authors
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Figure 5
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Figure 5: The number of items swapped during the 5-year simulation periods 
Source: simulation results by the authors
Figure 6: The number of white stocks used during the 5-year simulation periods 
Source: simulation results by the authors
 sourcing decisions were strongly predicated on the 
past successes of each sourcing option. As a member 
organization experienced and learned that white stock 
options were dependable in the case of catastrophic events, 
there was a tendency for members to develop dependency 
toward this reliable option.  Such tendency did not 
respond strongly to changes in the variance of underlying 
distribution of humanitarian demand: when the variance 
of distribution was doubled (Fig. A.1-2 in Appendix 3) or 
halved (Fig. A.1-3 in Appendix3), member organizations 
continued to store less of their own items in the UN storage 
under the flexible budget regime. 
 The modeling outcome will likely change, of course, 
when white stock availability is tightly constrained. In this 
case, direct trade-offs may be observed between white 
stock availability, delivery success and member decisions 
to store own items at both the UN and own facilities. Under 
a flexible budget, it is unlikely that a member organization 
on its own volition will continue to store own items at the 
UN storage and have adequate capacities to swap items in 
the case of acute demand hikes. Quantitative measures (such 
as minimum storage requirement at the UN storage) may 
be effective to induce continued storage of own items in 
such case. 
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4.2. Budget constrained regime 
 Under the constrained budget regime, a different 
system behavior was observed. Assuming that a member 
organization may not request any additional stock-swaps 
or white-stocks in the case of catastrophic humanitarian 
events, success rates drop as a result. Under tight budget 
const raints , Member Organizat ion 1 and Member 
Organization 2 experienced 24 days and 22 days in which 
success rates dropped below 1. Ironically, the member 
organizations’ inability to access stock-swaps and white 
stocks in catastrophic cases ensured that they continued 
to store own items at both UN and own facilities (Fig. 3 
C2). The levels of own items stored at the UN facilities 
were recorded on average at 12.3 units and 26.2 units for 
Member 1 and Member 2, respectively. The uses of stock-
swaps on average were recorded at 0 units for Member 1 
and 1 unit for Member 2 (Fig. 4 C2).  The uses of white 
stock were on average 0 units for Member 1 and 3 units for 
Member 2 (Fig. 5 C2). 
5. Initial lessons drawn and for further research
 The modeling results indicate the system behaved 
sensitively to changes in few parameters and assumptions, 
highlight ing the impor tance of understanding and 
incorporating individual decision heuristics of member 
organizations. Given the diverse character ist ics of 
humanitarian organizations participating in horizontal 
cooperation, it is highly plausible that the increasing 
number of organizations with different purchasing, pre-
positioning and dispatching preferences will affect overall 
system behaviors. 
 Even with a simple set of assumptions and a few agent 
interactions, this stylized model offers important insights 
into the system behaviors of voluntary humanitarian 
cooperation. Due to the highly stochastic nature of rapid 
onset humanitarian crises, it is diff icult for member 
organizations to accurately forecast and pre-position relief 
items that also meet their monthly budgets. When demands 
were particularly high, therefore, organizations often 
failed to meet their delivery target. Budget flexibility was 
an important element that allowed member organizations 
to meet their coverage targets under highly stochastic 
demands, confirming the observations made by the existing 
studies such as Toyasaki and Wakolbinger (2014). 
 When we further assumed that member organizations’ 
past success inf luenced their future sourcing decisions, 
the system began to exhibit undesirable dependency. 
As more demands were met by buffering capacities, 
organizations were discouraged from stocking their own 
items. Under such arrangement, simultaneously meeting 
goals of providing sufficient buffering capacities and 
serving highly stochastic demands within a short lead-
time (of 24 to 48 hours) under the fully voluntary nature 
of common stock pooling becomes increasingly difficult 
as diverse members with a range of behavioral preferences 
enter into the system.  The service provider approach 
currently taken does not offer any explicit incentives or 
penalties to influence member decision-making. In extreme 
cases, therefore, pure free-riding is possible whereby an 
organization does not store any items at the UN facility 
while still availing itself of the buffer capacities offered by 
horizontal cooperation. 
 Currently, the model lacks sophistication in many 
aspects such as budget behaviors, sourcing decisions 
and entry and exist options. Further research is therefore 
required to realistically model humanitarian cooperation. 
Key research questions that remain include:
•  Inter-temporal budget constraints and seasonal 
forecasting: The current budgeting rule simply assumed 
that members must meet monthly budget limits and any 
excess budgets were carried over to following months. It 
did not, however, allow for the uses of future budgets to 
meet current demands. In the case of highly stochastic 
and varying demands, some organizations may decide 
to serve current demands in the hope that they will 
face lower demands in following periods. This type of 
decision rule may be plausible under seasonal demand 
fluctuations (such as high relief demands during cyclone 
and followed by low demands during non-cyclone 
seasons). These types of inter-temporal flexibility should 
be explored for more realistic model humanitarian 
coordination.  
• Sourcing preferences and alternative resource 
allocation rules: The current sourcing rules simply 
assumed that member organizations chose sourcing 
options based on the past performance. While such 
learning behavior is plausible, some organizations may 
employ other heuristics such as cost minimization and 
minimum storage levels. Further sophistication in terms 
of alternative sourcing decision rules should be explored 
in the future.  
• Stochasticity of lead time: In the interest of ease in 
interpretation, the current model simply assumed that 
the lead-time of each sourcing option did not change due 
to locations or delivery orders. This may be unrealistic 
since the time it takes to deliver relief goods may affect 
factors such as distances to crises, administrative 
processes required at each location, and the number of 
organizations that are making simultaneous shipment 
orders. Further studies exploring these aspects will be 
useful. 
• Entry and exist decisions: The current model is 
simplistic in that no entry and exist decisions are 
explicitly modeled (i.e. member organizations may 
reduce stock levels at but never completely exit the 
system). This is unrealistic since member organizations 
at any t ime may decide to exit , when cont inued 
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membership conflicts with their strategic and operational 
goals. Likewise, it is reasonable to assume that a new 
member may enter at any time, potentially altering 
system performance. How their individual experience 
as well as member linkages and reputations (Stephenson 
Jr and Schnitzer, 2006) may inf luence horizontal 
cooperation is an important area for further research.  
• Detailed incorporation of additional costs including 
consolidated transport and penalty for unused 
stocks: The current model lacks many details regarding 
inventory and operation costs including detailed costs 
for storage, transportation (e.g. evaluation of individual 
versus consolidated transportation under horizontal 
cooperation  as discussed in Gatignon A., et al. (2010)), 
and potential penalty costs for unused stocks.5 Further 
studies incorporating empirical information in these 
regards will be helpful.
• Multiple depot locations and relief items: While this 
stylized case only considered one collective depot and 
one relief item, the actual UNHRD operation is far more 
complex where six depots located globally hold as much 
as 400 types of relief items (UNHRD 2015). Although 
modeling full complexity may be impractical, further 
inclusion of some of these aspects such as additional 
search costs that may arise from unstandardized relief 
items (Toyasaki and Wakolbinger 2014) and under 
multiple depot locations may be useful to answer key 
policy and coordination questions.
5  While the UNHRD system does not specify such penalty 
cost at the time of writing, member interviews indicate 
that there has been discussion where organizations 
may either be encouraged to remove unused stocks 
that are stored for more than two years at the common 
warehouse or to pay penalty fees.  
6. Conclusion
 This article proposed a multi-agent simulation model 
of horizontal cooperation using the UNHRD system as an 
example. A stylized model of one service provider, two 
member organization and multiple humanitarian crises 
was developed to evaluate four sourcing options, namely: 
i) own storage ii) UN storage for own items iii) stock-swap 
and iv) white stock uses under two budgeting regimes of 
fixed and flexible constraints. 
 Under the plausible assumpt ion that member 
organizations choose sourcing options based on how 
well each have performed in the past, the simulation 
found that the additional buffer stock capacity offered by 
horizontal cooperation (i.e. stock swaps and white stocks) 
seems to induce system dependency. The buffer capacity 
gives members more flexibility to meet highly stochastic 
demands. At the same t ime, it encourages member 
organizations to store less of their own relief goods as a 
result. The tendency was particularly notable under the 
flexible budgeting regime where additional funding became 
available in the case of a catastrophic event. The model 
therefore highlights the difficulty in meeting multiple 
system goals such as providing suff icient buffering 
capacities, meeting highly stochastic demands, and also 
maintaining the fully voluntary nature of individual storage 
decisions. 
 While the model was kept simple to allow for clear 
interpretation of results, further fine-tuning and evaluations 
are certainly useful to explore aspects such as the impact of 
inter-temporal budget constraints and alternative allocation 
rules, stochasticity of lead time, entry and exist decisions, 
and the potential incorporation of multiple depot locations 
and relief items.
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Appendix 1: List of Interviews conducted
Organizations Countries Positions Dates
Cooperative for Assistance 
and Relief Everywhere 
(CARE)
US Senior Manager Logistics and Operations Emergency 08.07.2014
United Nation 
Humanitarian Response 
Depots (UNHRD)
Italy Chief 22.07.2014
Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) Japan Deputy Director General 30.07.2014
Lutheran World Relief 
(LWR) US Emergency Program Manager 04.11.2014
MercyCorps US Strategic Emergency Response 
Team
04.11.2014
Norwegian Church Aid’s 
(NCA) Norway Head of Global Logistics 17.11.2014
World Vision Australia Global Lead - Emergency 
logistics
18.12.2014
ShelterBoX UK Supply Chain Manager 18.12.2014
APPENDIX
Appendix 1:
Table A.1: List of Interviews conducted
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Appendix 2: Pseudo-Code for Shipment Decision-Making by Member Agents
To calculate distance and make shipment 
at each timestep, ask each member agent:
 [ask each crisis 
  if (remaining demand > 0) 
  [determine if the location of the crisis is closer to UNHRD storage or own storage of the member
   if (UNHRD storage is closer and UNHRD stock is sufficient)
   then schedule a delivery from the UNHRD facility that will satisfy all the demand and designate the 
delivery as ‘UNHRD storage’ 
               
   if (UNHRD storage is closer but UNHRD stock is not sufficient)
   then schedule a delivery from the UNHRD facility first that will satisfy part of the demand (‘UNHRD 
storage’), then schedule a delivery from your own facility (‘own storage’)
               
   if (own storage is  closer and own storage stock is sufficient)
   then schedule a delivery from own facility that will satisfy all the demand and designate the delivery 
as ‘own storage’
               
   if (own storage is closer but own storage stock is not sufficient)
   then schedule a delivery from own facility first that will satisfy part of the demand (‘own storage’), 
then schedule a delivery from the UNHRD facility (‘UNHRD storage’)]
  if demand is still unsatisfied at this stage schedule (remaining demand > 0)  a delivery from unused sources 
  (own/UN storage) to fulfill  remaining demand]
end; 
To swap
if demand is still unsatisfied at this stage (remaining demand > 0)
          [then select other member with the largest remaining stock at the UNHRD facility for stock swap
   if (found and available swap stock is sufficient) 
   then schedule a delivery from UNHRD that will satisfy all the demand and designate it as (‘swap’)
                      
   if (found but available swap stock is insufficient) 
   then schedule a delivery from UNHRD that will satisfy part of the demand and designate the 
   delivery as ‘swap’]
end;
to use white stock
if demand is still unsatisfied at this stage [
 then see if UNHRD has white stock available 
   if (white stock available is sufficient)
   then schedule a delivery from UNHRD that will satisfy all the demand and designate the delivery as ‘white stock’
                  if (white stock available is insufficient)
           then schedule a delivery from UNHRD that will satisfy part of the demand and designate the delivery as 
‘white stock’]
 
end;
To schedule a delivery [member ID, Crisis ID, quantity of shipment, lead-time, origin of shipment]
create a tuple that describes a member organizations’ delivery order
 allow delivery (list quantity of shipment, crisis ID, scheduled delivery time, origin of shipment, time of initial crisis, 
end time for record)
 add a new tuple at the end of their list of deliveries 
 decrement stocks levels at each sourcing option accordingly
end;
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Figure A.1: UN storage use from an alternative stochastic run with (alpha = 2, gamma 0.08)
To process a delivery
at each timestep, ask each member agent to search through its list of deliveries to see if there are any orders that are ready [
 if (scheduled delivery time <= ticks) [   
  ask each crisis agent to receive relief items by decrementing their remaining demand variable.
  remove the current delivery from the list of deliveries entry from the 
  add the delivery information to the list of recorded deliveries]
        
  proceed to the next tuple]
end;  
Appendix 3:
Figure A.2
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Figure A.2: Own storage use from an alternative stochastic run with (alpha = 2, gamma 0.08)
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Figure A.3 UN storage use from an alternative stochastic run with (alpha = 8, gamma 0.32)
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Figure A.3: UN storage use from an alternative stochastic run with (alpha = 8, gamma 0.32)
Figure A.3 Own storage use from an alternative stochastic run with (alpha = 8, gamma 0.32)
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Figure A.4: Own storage use from an alternative stochastic run with (alpha = 8, gamma 0.32)
